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Abstract- -For  systems in which the probability that an incorrect output is observed ~ with in- 
put values, we adopt the redundant use of n copies of identical systems which we call the 
n-redundant system. First, it is proved that the n-redundant system that minimizes the mean 
loss is a k-out-of-n redundant system under the condition that the voter functions perfectly, and a 
necessary c~mditlon for reducing the mean loss by the redundant use is clarified. Next, the paper 
discusses the redundancy technique for rnlnirni~ing the probability of dangerous errors. The results 
provide an effective guide to fail-safe design of systems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For prevention of great loss due to the occurrence of an accident, it is important not only to design 
a highly reliable system in which no failures or abnormal conditions occur, but also to design 
a fail-safe system that never comes to a dangerous state even if failures or abnormal conditions 
occur. Control, monitoring or protection equipments set in many large systems are required that 
their malfunction ever causes dangerous errors. But the realization of perfect fall-safe design 
with zero probability of dangerous errors (D-errors) is very difficult. Even then, it is necessary 
to make the probability of D-errors as small as possible. This paper aims at doing it through the 
use of redundancy. 
For systems in which the probability that an incorrect output is observed iffers with input 
values, we adopt the redundant use of n copies of identical systems which we call the n-redundant 
systems. It is proved that a k-out-of-n redundancy minimizes the mean loss of n-redundant 
systems, and a necessary condition for reducing the mean loss by the redundant use is clarified. 
This is a generalization of the former work Ell, which assumes that the probability of an incorrect 
output does not depend on input values, but only on correct output value. Next, some discussions 
on optimal redundancy for minimizing the probability of D-errors and on the necessary conditions 
for reducing its probability are given. Moreover, the minimization of the probability of D-errors 
often results in the increase of the probability of safe errors. Therefore, minimizing the probability 
of D-errors under the constraint on the probability of output errors is also considered. 
2. m-VALUED OUTPUT SYSTEMS AND DANGEROUS ERRORS 
Consider an m-valued output system S which issues any one of m possible output values 
(signals) in r s  - {0 ,1 ,2 , . . . ,m-  1} according to requirements. The system S has 
inputs (z l ,z2, . . .  ,zt) and input zi(i - 1 ,2, . . . , t )  and takes any one of cl possible values in 
t 
I'~ -- {0, 1,2,...,c~ - 1}. Define X - (z l ,z2, . . .  ,zt) and r l  --- x ri. Then, the system S is 
i=1 
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designed to issue the output value of discrete function f (X )  (mapping f : r I  ~ rs )  for input X. 
The system is normal if the observed output is r for the correct output r(= f (X ) ) .  But there 
is a possibility that the observed output incorrectly becomes p(y ~ r) due to the occurrence of 
faults in the system or abnormal conditions. 
A safety monitoring system [2] such as an automatic fire alarm system and a safety confirmation 
system [3] of automatic equipments such as robotics which never issues any signal for permission 
until safe situation is confirmed are examples of 2-valued output systems. A reactor protection 
system in a nuclear power plant issues any one of three signals corresponding to normal, warning, 
and reactor shut-down conditions--it is an example of a 3-valued output system. A control 
system for controlling an equipment at several stages of physical quantity such as flow flux, 
speed, pressure is also an example of a multiple-valued output system. Some discussions [4] 
related to optimal design of safety monitoring systems have been made. 
The following notation is defined for the m-valued output system: 
Px,p : probability that the observed output is y for input X; E Px,p = 1 for X E I'x. 
PEPs 
y m-1 
PL(x ,p )  - px,6 O) 
6=0 6=p 
ax  : probability of occurrence of input X; E ax  = 1. 
XEI'z 
wr,p : loss sustained when the output value r is correct and y is observed. 
The mean loss W1 of the system is given by 
w, = (2) 
X EFt pEPs 
When an output error occurs, i.e., the observed output incorrectly becomes y(y ~ r) for the 
correct output r, the error is dangerous error (D-error) whose occurrence may cause an undated 
negative consequence or safe error (S-error) whose occurrence may cause no serious cons~iuen~. 
Set 6r.p = 1 i f  it is D-error and 6r,u = 0 if it is S-error, where 6r,r = 0 for no error. Then, a 
matrix A in which the (r, y)-element is 6r.p is defined. In matrix A, the set of elements with 
6~,p = 1 is called D-domain. D-domain is partitioned into Di-domain and D2-domain, which 
are the upper right part and lower left part of diagonal elements, respectively. If only one of 
Dl-domaln and D2-domain is null set, i.e., D-domain consists of only one side of two domains, 
then the system is said to be 1-sided dangerous, and if neither of Dl-domain and D2-domain are 
null, then the system is said to be 2-sided dangerous. This paper considers the probability of 
D-errors as an index expressing fail-safe characteristics of the system. The probability of D-errors 
is 
po,  =  x s(x),ppx,p. (3) 
XEPz pEFs 
PD1 is equal to the mean loss Wz when wr,~ = 1 for D-errors and wr,p = 0 for S-errors or correct 
outputs. 
3. n-REDUNDANT SYSTEMS 
For an n-redundant system in which n copies of m-valued output systems $1, $2, . . .  , Sn(n >_ 2) 
are redundantly used, the observed output y is determined from the observed outputs of n copies, 
Yz, Y2,... ,Y, ,  through a voter. In general, y is represented as an m-valued logical function of 
Yl,~,... ,Yn 
Y = ~(Yl,Y2,. . . ,Yn)" (4) 
We call this logical function ~ the structure function of the n-redundant system. 
The following assumptions [1] are made for n-redundant systems: 
(1) Output errors of n systems occurs statistical-independently, i.e., the probability that the 
observed outputs of n systems are Yl, Y2,..., Yn for input X is given by the product 
PX,uI PX,p2 • • • PX,p.. 
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(2) The structure function of n-redundant systems is restricted to multi-state coherent struc- 
ture functions defined by Barlow and Wu [5]. This means that the voter can be composed 
of only two kind of operators, logical product and logical sum, defined by 
y.  z = min (y, z), y V z = max (y, z). (5 )  
Then, the structure function ¢(Yl,Y~ . . . .  ,y,) can be expressed by using variables 
Yl,Y2, ... ,y,  and two operators • , V--without using other operators uch as negation 
or constant numbers. 
(3) The voter functions perfectly. This means that output errors are never caused by the 
voter. 
The following notation is defined for the n-redundant system: 
p(n) x,y : probability that the observed output is y for input X;  E ex,v  "(") = 1 for X E Ft. 
y6I's 
y m--1 
P(") - (6 )  
L(x,~) - u(x ,y )  = • 
6=0 6=y 
p( - )  Note the following relations hold, where PL(x , -D  = 0 and .  L (x , -D  = O. 
Pucx,y) 1 - PL(x,y-1) I:)(") I:)(") (0 < < m -- 1). = , "~](x,v) = 1 - • £(x ,~- l )  - Y - -  
Consider a 2-valued logical function z = ¢(zl,z~,... ,zn) obtained from the function y = 
¢(y l ,y~, . . .  ,Yn) by replacing m-valued variables Y l ,Y2 , . . . , y ,  with 2-valued variables 
z l , z2 , . . .  ,zn,  respectively, and logical sum (or product) operators with logical sum (or prod- 
uct) operators in 2-valued logic. This 2:valued logical function is monotone increasing in each 
variable since it can be expressed by using only two operators by Assumption 2. Thus, under 
Assumption 2, the structure functions y = ¢(Yl, Y2,... , Y,) correspond one-to-one to coherent 
structure functions [6] in 2-state reliability theory. 
Let R(p l ,p~, . . .  , p , )  be the reliability function for the structure function z - ~b(zl, z~,... , zn) 
in 2-state reliability theory and h(p) -- R (p ,p , . . .  ,p), where Pi - Pr{z i  -- 1}. In general, the 
function h(p) can be expressed as 
h(p)  = A i r (1  - 
j=0 
(T) 
Aj(j  - 0, 1 , . . . ,  n) is the path number of size j [7] which means that the number of vectors 
( z l , z~, . . .  , z , ) ,  in which exactly j variables take 1 and others take 0 and for which 
¢(zl, z2,... , z,) = 1, hold. 
Then, the following relations hold. 
P(") P(") = 1 - h(1 - P~, (x ,y ) )  v(x , , )  = h(Pv(x ,v) ) ,  " L(x,~) (8 )  
= - = h(1  - - h (1  - (9 )  
(XEY I ,  0<y<m-1) .  
An n-redundant system is said to be k-out-of-n redundant (1 < k < n) if its observed output y 
is determined by y -- Y(k) when Y l ,Y~, . . .  ,Y ,  are rearranged in decreasing order such that 
YO) >- Y(2) >_ ... > Y(,). The redundant system is parallel redundant for k = 1, and series 
redundant for k -- n. The structure function of k-out-of-n redundant systems is obtained by 
changing each variable of the structure function of two-valued k-out-of-n redundant systems into 
an m-valued variable. 
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The reliability function of 2-valued k-out-of-n redundant systems is given by the following: 
./=l: 
(lo) 
Needless to say, Eqs. (8) and (9) also hold for k-out-of- n redundant systems. 
Define 
/3 j -A i  / (~)  (O<-j<-n), a i=--~J -~i - l ( l  <-j<-n)" 
Then, it has been proved [8] that the following relation holds. 
(11) 
n 
h(p) = ~a,h~, . (p ) ,  where 0 ~ ak ~ 1(1 < k < . )  and ~.~ = 1. 
b=l k=l 
4. OPTIMAL REDUNDANCY FOR MINIMIZING MEAN LOSS 
(12) 
Optimal Redundancy 
The mean loss of an n-redundant system is given by 
XEI'x yEI's XEr't yEr'$ 
Similarly, the mean loss of a k-out-of-n redundant system is given by 
XEI'I yEr'$ 
(14) 
PROPERTY 1. The n-redundant system of minimising the mean loss Wn is a k-out-of-n redundant 
system. 
PttOOF. By substituting (12) into (13), 
n 
w. = ~ ~ ,~x,os~,,)., ~, ,,(h,,..(~.,~x.,,))- h,~..(P~,~x.,+,))) 
XEI't y¢Cs kfl  
= ~ ak E ~xw.t(x),,{hk,n(Pv(x,,))- hl:,r,(Pv'(x,,+l))} 
r yEI's 
(15) 
f l  
= ~_~ akWk,. > rain Wk,. 
- -  k 
k----1 
Let k* be the value of k that minimizes Wk,,. Then Wk-,, is the minimum value of Wn. II 
In practice, we may assume that the probability px j (x ) (X  E FI) that the observed output is 
the correct output is greater than 1/2. Therefore, the following assumptions are made. 
(A1) Pz(x,u) < 1/2 and P•(x,u+l) > 1/2 hold for y < f (X) (X  E rz). 
(A2) Pu(x,~) < 1/2 and PL(x,u-x) > 1/2 hold for y > f (X ) (X  E rz). 
Then the following property is obtained. 
PROPERTY 2. 
(1) If Wr,y >_ 0 for y < r and tvr,u = 0 for y >_ r, for all r E rs,  then parallel redundancy is 
optimal, i.e., k* = 1. 
(2) If  wr,u = 0 for y <_ r and wr,u >_ 0 for y > r, for all r E Fs, then series redundancy is 
optimal, i.e., k* - n. 
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PROOF. From Eq. (I0), 
dhk,n(p) = ]~k,. (1 - p ) . - I  (16) 
dr, 
n! 
where ~k,. - (k - 1)!(n - k)l' then/91,. =/~., .  = n = n~n/~k,, holds. In the case of 1 > p > 
1/2, since ~ > 1, dhk,.(P)dp is minimized when k = 1, and in the case of 0 _< p < 1/2, since 
P < 1,dhk'---. "(p) is minimized when k 
i - -p  dp 
n, 
(1) In this case, 
wk, .= axws(x),~{hk,.(Pv(x,u)) - hk,.(Pv(x,v+l))}. 
XEFt yEFs 
(v<S(x)) 
Pu(x,v) > Pv(x,u+l) > 1/2 holds by assumption A1 and dhk,,(p) is, hence, minimized for 
- dp 
all p satisfying Pu(x,~) <_ P <_ Pv(x,v+l) when k = 1. Since the value in the bracket { } 
fPt,~x.,,) alp, it is minimi~.ed when k = 1. dhLn (P) equals 
dPu(x,y+*) dp 
(2) In this case, 
W,,.  = E E axWl(x),, lhk,n(Pu(x,,))  - hk,n(Pv(xa+,))}. 
XEFt yEPs 
(v>l(x)) 
Since Pv(x,v+l) <_ Pv(x,v) < 1/2 by assumption A2, the value in the bracket { } is 
minimized when k = n by the discussions imilar to (1). II 
Necessary Condition for Reducing the Mean Loss 
Next, we consider a necessary condition for reducing the mean loss by the redundant use. 
Classify 2-valued logical functions z = ~(zl, z~,... , zn) obtained from the structure functions ~b 
of n-redundant systems by the following conditions related to their sum-of-products forms and 
product-of-sums forms. 
(i) The sum-of-products form does not include any product term of which the degree (the 
number of variables) is one, and the product-of-sums form does not include any alterm 
of which the degree is one. In this case, h(p) has S-shapedness for 0 < p < 1, and 
h'(0) = h'(1) = 0 holds [9]. 
(ii) The sum-of-products form includes at least one product term of which the degree is one. 
In this case, h'(0) > 1 and h'(1) = 0 hold [9]. 
(iii) The product-of-sums form includes at least one alterm of which the degree is one. In this 
case, h'(0) = 0 and h'(1) > 1 hold [9]. 
For example, k-out-of-n redundancy (2 < k < n -1)  satisfies Condition (i), 1-out-of-n redundancy 
(parallel redundancy) does Condition (ii) and n-out-of-n redundancy (series redundancy) does 
Condition (iii). 
PROPERTY 3. 
(1) When the function z = ¢(z l , z~, . . . , z , )  satisfies 
(0 < Pl < P~ < 1) such that h'(pl) = h'(p~) = 
O<_p<pl  andp2 <p < 1. 
(2) When it satisfies Condition (ii) , there exists p2(O < 
0 < h'(p) < 1 holds for p2 < p < 1. 
(3) When it satisfies Condition (iii), there exists px (O < 
0 < h'(p) < 1 holds for 0 < p < Pl. Where h'(a) = - -  
Condition (0, there exist Pl and p~ 
1 and then 0 <_ h'(p) < 1 holds for 
p~ < 1) such that h'(p~) = 1 and then 
Pl < 1) such that h'(pl) = 1 and then 
d p)] 
dp Ip=." 
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Table 1. Values of Pl (upmost), P2 (lowest) and Pk,n (middle) of k-out-of-n redundant 
systems. 
k 
n 
1 4 5 
0.5000 
0.3066 
0.2929 
0.2752 
2 3 
0.5000 
0.2112 0.6934 
0.500 
O.7888 
0.1037 0.3612 
0.232 0.768 
0.6388 0.8963 
0.06025 0.2403 
0.131 0.500 
0.5505 0.7597 
0.7071 
0.4495 0.7248 
0.869 
0.93975 
PROOF.  
(1) Since h(p) has S-shapedness for 0 _< p < 1, and h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1, h'(O) = h'(1) = 0 
hold, there exists P0 (0 < P0 < 1) such that h*(p0) > 1. Thus, there exist pl and P2 since 
h'(p) >_ 0 for 0 _<p < 1. 
(2) Since h'(0) > 1 and h'(1) = 0 hold, there exists P2. 
(3) Since h'(0) = 0 and h'(1) > 1 hold, there exists Pt. | 
The Pl and P2 of k-out-of-n redundant systems (2 < n < 5) are shown in Table 1. Moreover, 
the value Pk,n of p that satisfies ht,.(p) = p(0 < p < 1) are obtained [7] for 2 _< k _< n - 1, 
and hk,n(p) < p holds for 0 < p < pt,n and hk,n(p) > p holds for pt,,, < p < 1 (note that 
pl < pk,. < P2 holds). The pt, .  of k-out-of-n redundant systems (2 < n < 5) are also shown in 
Table 1. 
The following property provides the condition for p(") to get smaller than Px,v. X,y 
PROPERTY 4. I f  0 < Pu(x,~) < Pt or P2 < Pv(x,~+I) < 1 holds for input X in case where the 
-(") hal&. / f  structure function ¢ of n-redundant system satisfies Condition (i), then ~'x,~ < Px,y 
P2 < Pu(x,~+l) < 1 (or 0 < Pu(x,y) < Pt) holds for input X in case where the function ~ satisfies 
Condition (ii) (or Condition (iii) ), then ,~(n) < Px,~ holds, where it is supposed that Px,u ~ 0 FX,y 
holds. 
PROOF. Pu(x,~) ~ Pu(x,y+l) holds since Px,~ ~ O. In each case, using Property 3, 0 < h'(p) < 1 
holds for Pu(x,y+l) < P < Pu(x,y). Therefore, ,~(") = h(Pu(x,y)) - h(Pu(x,~+l)) < Pu(x,y) -
- -  - -  ~ 'X ,y  
Pv(x,u+I) = Px,y holds. 
Using Property 4, the condition for reducing 
in the following property. 
| 
the mean loss by the redundant use is obtained 
PROPERTY 5. Suppose that wr,y >_ wr,r (g ~ r) hold for all r E rs. Ill there exists at least 
one k-out-of-n redundant system (2 <_ k <_ n - 1) such that Pu(x,v+l) > P2 for y < f (X)  and 
Pu(x,y) < Pt for t />  f (X)  hold for all inputs X, then Wk*,n < W1 holds, where it is supposed 
that Px,y = 0 or wl(x),y = Wl(x)d(x) does not hold for all of(X,y)(y ~ f(X)) .  
PROOF. For a k-out-of-n redundant system, 
= .xws(x.(x) + Z,  Z ,  • 
xEr'z XEFI yEFs 
(y#f(x)) 
In the case where the above-mentioned r lation holds, since Condition (i) is satisfied, then 
p(n) x,v < Px,~ holds on condition that Px,y ~ 0 by Property 4. Therefore, Wk,n < Wt  holds, since 
Wk.,. _< Wt,n, Wk.,. < W1 holds. | 
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Usually, the probability Px,I(x)(X E r l )  that the observed output is the correct output is 
nearly 1. Then, the relation of Property 5 holds. 
5. IMPROVEMENT OF  THE PROBABIL ITY  OF  D-ERRORS 
Optimal Redundanc~l for Minimizing the Probability of D-errors 
The probability of D-errors, PD., of n=redundant systems is given by 
X EP# yEPs 
(17) 
PDn is equal to the mean loss Wn when wr,u = I for D-errors and wr,u = 0 for S-errors or correct 
outputs. Therefore, Properties 1 and 2 are restated for the probability of D-errors as follows: 
PROPERTY 1 ~. The n-redundant system of m/n/m/zing the probability of D-errors, PD,, is a 
k-out-of-n redundant system. 
Let k* be the value of k that minimizes the probability of D-Errors, PDt,n, of k-out-of-n 
redundant system. Then PDt.,n is the minimum of PD,. 
PROPERTY 2 I. 
(1) For a l-sided dangerous system consisting of only D2-domain, parallel redundancy mini- 
m/zes PDn. 
(2) For a l-sided dangerous system consisting of only Dt-doma~n, series redundancy m/n/m/zes 
PDn. 
Necessary Condition for Reducing the Probability of D-Errors 
Similarly, Property 5 is restated as the following Property 5', which provides the condition for 
reducing the probability of D-errors by the redundant use. 
PROPERTY 5'. If there exist at least one k-out-of-n redundant system (2 < k < n -- 1) such that 
Pu(x,~+1) > P2 hold for outputs y satisfying b/(x),v = 1 and y < I(X) and Pu(x,u) < Pl hold 
for outputs V satisfying 61(x),~ = 1 and/ /> f(X), for all inputs X, then PDt*,n < PD1 holds. 
This holds, especially, if Dz-domain is composed such that it is D-error when the observed 
output V satisfies S(r) _< V _~ m-  1 for the correct output r (i.e., it is S-error when r < y < S(r)) 
and D2-domain is composed such that it is D-error when 0 _< y _< T(r) (i.e., it is S-error when 
T(r) < y < r ) where S(r) and T(r) are specific outputs satisfying r < S(r) <_ m-  1 and 
0 <_ T(r) < r, respectively. 
PROPERTY 6. lf Pg(x,s(l(X))) < Pt,n and PU(X,T(f(X))+I) > Pt,n, for all the inputs X, hold for 
at least one k-out-of-n redundant system (2 _< k _< n - I), then PD~.,, < PD1 holds. 
PROOF. In this case, 
PD1 = E ax(l - PU(X,T(I(X))+I) + Pu(x,s(I(x)))), 
XEPt 
PD~,n = E ax(1 - hk,n(Pv(x,T(I(X))+I)) +hk,n(Pv(x,s(l(x))))). 
x E I't 
Since hk,.(Pu(x,s(l(x)))) < Pu(x,s(l(x))) and hk,n(Pu(x,T(I(X))+t)) > PU(X,TO'(X))+I) hold, 
PDk,n < PDI holds. Since PDk*,n <_ PDk,n, PDk.,, < PD1 holds. | 
Consideration on Failures of the Voter 
In the above discussions, we assume that the voter functions perfectly. In case of considering 
the possibility of output errors due to failures of the voter, let PD'n be the probability of D-errors 
and PDn v be the probability that D-errors occur due to failures of the voter though either correct 
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outputs or S-errors would occur  if the voter is normal. Then PD'n ~- PDn + PD~. In order to 
hold PD'n ~. PD~, the relation PDn ~. PD~ and 
PD~ ,~. PD~ (18) 
are necessary. If the voter to realize the optimal redundancy does not satisfy (18), we are needed 
to find other voters with simpler structure, such as series-parallel structures [10], or to improve 
the fail-safe characteristics of the voter. 
6. OPTIMAL REDUNDANCY FOR MINIMIZING 
THE PROBABIL ITY  OF D-ERRORS 
UNDER THE CONSTRAINT ON THE PROBABIL ITY  OF OUTPUT ERRORS 
From Eq. (15), the mean loss Wn is expressed as a linear combination of Wk,n, k - 1,2,.. .  ,n. 
We hence have for PDn 
n 
PDn = E akPDk,n. (19) 
Since the probability of output errors containing both D-errors and S-errors, En, of n-redundant 
systems is equal to the mean loss Wn when wr,~ = 1 for each output error and wr,r = 0 for 
correct output, we also have 
n 
En = E akEk,n , (20) 
k=l  
where Eh,n is the probability of output errors of k-out-of-n redundant systems. 
The probability of output errors is an index related to fault-tolerance. The minimization 
of PDn does not necessarily mean the decrease of En. For a 1-sided dangerous ystem, the 
use of series or parallel redundancy often causes the increase of En, since h(p) does not h~ve 
S-shapedness. Therefore we have the problem of minimizing PDn under some constraint of En. 
PROPERTY 7. The n-redundant system of minimizing PDn under the constraint En <_ E 
(E: specified constant) is obtained as follows: 
(1) Suppose PDt.,n minimizes PDn from Property Ie. If Ek.,n <_ E, the k*-out-of-n redun- 
dant system is optimal. 
(2) /n case of Et.,n > E. Let f~l = {k ] Et,n < E} and f~2 = {k I Ek,n > E} . Obtain 
kl ~ ~'~1 and k 2 ~ ~2 which satisfy 
[POk, n-PDk,n '~ rain (eDt ,n-PDk2,n '~ (21) PD~t,n - PDk2,n = max = . 
E~2,n-Eka,n I, En~ k, E~:n- E~,,n J ~¢n, k Ek~,n-E~,n ] 
Let 
, - E - E~, ,n  (22)  Ek~,~ E and a~2 = 
a~l = Ek2,n - Ekl,n Ek2,n - Eke,n" 
Then, a*kaPDh,n + a*k2PDk2,n is the minimum value of PDn (note that all + ai~ "- 1 
and a*k~ Ek~,n + a*~2Ek2,n = E hold). That is, the optimal n-redundant system is to adopt 
the kl-out-of-n redundancy with probability a* and the k2-out-of-n redundancy with kl 
probability a~ . 
PROOF. 
(1) is trivial. 
(2) Let bk and ck be the insides of the brackets ( ) of the second and third expressions of (21), 
then bk2 and ok1 are equal to the inside of the bracket ( ) of the first expremion of (21). 
And, let ~--- ~1 U f~2 = {1,2,. . . ,n}. 
a'k, PoDh,n + a~2PDk2,n = (1 - a*k2)PDk,,n + a'~2PDk2,n 
= PDk~,n - a~ 2 (PDka,n - PDk2,n) (23) 
= POk,,n - al, bk,(El,,,n - Ek,,n) 
= PDk,,n - bk2(E - E~,,n) 
Optimal design of redundant systems 
Proof is to show that ~ a~PD~,. >_ a~PD~,n + a*~PD~,n holds for ~ a~Ek,n < E. 
kE~ k~['l 
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E akPDk,n = E akPDk,n + ~_~ akPDk,n 
kEN kEi'~l kEfla 
-- E ak{PDk.,. + c~(Ek2,. - Ek,n)} + E ak{PD~,,. - b~(E~.,n - E~,,.)} 
k~fI~ k~a 
> E a~{PD~.,n + b~.(E~.,. - E~,.)} + E a~{PDt,,.  - b~.(E~,. - E~,,n)} 
kEfl~ kEfla 
= a*~ PD~, .  + a*~PD~,. 
(24) 
(Pay attention to PD~, .  + bk2Ek~,. = PD~,n + bk~E~x,n holding from Eq. (23).) II 
In order to realize the n-redundant system expressed in Property 7.2, it is necessary that a 
voter of which the reliability function is h(p) = a~thka,n(p) + a~2hk2,n(p) is constructed. In the 
ease where such a voter cannot be constructed, it is necessary to use the kl-out-of-n voter and 
the kz-out-of- n voter in the ratio of a* k~ : a* k2, but in practice, it is necessary to find a voter of 
making PDn as small as possible under the constraint En < E. 
Moreover, the solution to the problem of obtaining the n-redundant system of minimizing the 
probability of output errors under the constraint on the probability of D-errors is also provided 
similarly. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we considered improving, through the use of redundancy, fail-safe characteristics 
of multiple-valued output systems in which the probability of an incorrect output differs with 
input values. The n-redundant system that minimizes the probability of dangerous errors is 
a k-out-of-n redundant system under the condition that the voter functions perfectly and its 
probability is ensured to get smaller than the probability of dangerous errors of single system. 
Some consideration on failure of the voter is also given. Moreover, minimizing the probability of 
D-errors under the constraint on the probability of output errors is considered. 
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